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Forms of populism have long been a component of modern political discourse 
and systems where democracy relies upon popular legitimacy.  There is, 
however, an uneasy relationship between some widely held views of ‘the 
people’ and the parties which seek to govern them. Contemporary academic 
and political discourse on populism often equates these views with right-wing 
politics, whilst some radical scholars, suggest that these views, whilst 
controversial, are nonetheless examples of democratic expression. Using 
survey evidence from fourteen European countries, we show that young people 
take up a mixture of political positions, some of which are strongly associated 
with indices of populism — cynicism, authoritarianism, nativism, xenophobia — 
others of which do not map neatly onto the typical ‘left-right’ spectrum. We find 
evidence that some young people hold contradictory, often conflicting political 
viewpoints, which are reflective of the historical and cultural contexts of each 
location rather than of a ‘populist’ ideology.  Where some theorists might use 
the term ‘populism’ pejoratively to denote a poorly and emotively grounded 
political ideology, we argue that this description denies its democratic 
legitimacy, as evidence suggests that young people draw on populist rhetoric 
to articulate views that are more reflective of local and regional concerns.
Introduction
The rise of political parties described as ‘populist’ has been widespread 
throughout Europe in recent years.  In many countries such parties now 
represent a more significant force, in terms of electoral success, than at any 
time since the end of WW2. Over the past twenty years populism has become a 
structural feature of most European party political systems, arguably 
constituting a new party type across the political spectrum (Zaslove, 2008). As 
such, it has been suggested that it represents a fundamental challenge to 
contemporary democracy (Pinelli, 2011).  Parties classified as ‘populist’ have 
been able to take significant numbers of MPs away from mainstream parties 
and in some countries they are able to enter into ruling coalition governments 
such as the Freedom Party in Austria 2000 to 2005. In some cases, the effect of 
this has been that populist parties now influence mainstream parties in their 
policy programme development (Jennings, 2011). This paper does not seek to 
explain why this has been the case; such an explanation would require a 
nuanced analysis of both the supply and demand related factors within any 
local historical context. It suggests, however, that the preconditions for such 
shifts in the political landscape can be illuminated through the exploration of 
empirically demonstrable demand related beliefs.
Much of the voluminous literature on populism discusses conceptual issues in 
an attempt to clarify precisely what is under analysis.  Early work on populism 
shows a concern with a phenomenon which is regarded as orthogonal to the 
left-right spectrum (Worsley, 1969; Laclau, 1979).  Understood thus, forms of 
populism have been seen as central to movements dedicated to promoting 
political developments that are of benefit to parts of the population in regions 
where large swathes feel the government is not representative of their 
concerns. 
The extension of voting rights to wider society during the early parts of the 
twentieth century broadened the content of politics beyond the sectoral 
interests of elites in society.  The roots of these changes, of course, lie in 
developments from the previous century such that change was gradual with no 
teleological trajectory (Tilly, 2004). There is no inevitable structure and 
trajectory for democracies, rather, they are built upon local and regional 
struggles, compromises and hegemonies, which means that the pace and type 
of politics that emerges is tied to cultural components that cannot be ignored 
(see, for example, Kopstein and Reilly, 2000). 
Despite this local specificity, the element of populism that is most accepted as 
a core conceptual feature is its association with forms of anti-elitism and a 
cynicism towards those who are responsible for government. This can be seen 
in the works of Canovan (1999) and Laclau (2005), for whom, ‘populism’, refers 
to ways that individuals express their unfulfilled political demands collectively 
in the face of established structures of power and authority and dominant ideas 
and cultural values. Thus, for both, populism is intricately tied to issues of 
representation and democracy, as the people’s concerns are a necessary part 
of the democratic process and must be heard. They differ on the extent to 
which populism is a good thing; Canovan (1999: 3, 10, 16) refers to populism 
as the ‘shadow’ of democracy on more than one occasion, for example. 
Nonetheless, there is no pejorative connotation here; populism is still 
considered a legitimate component of political discourse if not its central 
element.
There is another tradition, however, whose tone can be said to create folk 
devils of those who subscribe to positions which are commonly referred to as 
populist. Ruzza (2009: 87), for example, suggests that the emergence of an 
uncivil society can be attributed to the ‘anti-modern’ thinking of political actors, 
whose ‘territorial’ and ‘culturally exclusionist’ behaviour render them populist 
and, ultimately, undemocratic. Other arguments that place populism in 
opposition to democracy can be found also in work of Bale (2013), Baggini 
(2013) and Fieschi (2004).
In Hatred of Democracy, Jaques Rancière (2006: 80) points to the potential 
dangers and agendas that reside behind this academic dismissal of populist 
views. He writes that the term ‘populism’ is often used as a rhetorical strategy 
that silences dissent in relation to the prevailing consensus; the ‘oligarch’, as 
he calls it, of social and political science, works to govern without people, that 
is, ‘without any dividing of the people; to govern without politics’. The 
implication of this, for Rancière is that if science cannot impress its vision of 
progress upon the people, then those people are dismissed as ‘ignorant’, 
‘backward’ and attached to a past that is no longer in keeping with what the 
experts consider to be legitimate. Indeed, it is interesting that so little of the 
contemporary discourse is open to the possibility of populism as politics where 
populism is a form of political praxis (Laclau, 2005; Jansen, 2011), or of 
populism as a phenomenon that may exist comfortably on the left as well as 
the right (Deiwiks, 2009; March, 2011; Moffit and Tormey, 2014).
The divergent perspectives on populism stem from uncertainties over how to 
define its boundaries. For example, Brett (2013) describes populism as a 
‘stretched concept’, having been adapted by different researchers for different 
purposes. According to Brett (2013:  410), populism has been used by 
academics, policy-makers and politicians as a synonym for ‘popularity’ or to 
denote a wide-range of political positions from ‘violent racism to agrarian 
socialism’. The term has been used also to refer to ‘democratic argument’ 
(Painter, 2013) indicating the need to recognise that populism is as much a 
form of rhetoric, than strictly an ideological position. Indeed, populism refers to 
the rule of the people and, thus, implicitly acknowledges the need for 
democratic and debate and struggle. Similarly, the literature is divided over the 
extent to which populism is a problem for democracy; while some see it as a 
destabilising influence on political institutions others view it as a component 
capable of engaging the wider population in political debate (Vasilopoulou et 
al., 2014).  Arguably, understandings of populism are bound to contemporary 
manifestations of democracy; an ‘antagonistic discontinuity’ between the two 
renders fruitless attempts to close down populist discourse (Abts and 
Rummens, 2007).   
We take as our starting point the need to objectively examine forms of 
populism as legitimate political positions within a pluralist discourse.  According 
to Laclau and Mouffe (1984) social divisions are inherent in the very possibility 
of a democratic politics. One cannot simply erase from political discourse those 
positions or perspectives that one disagrees with. Such a move chimes with a 
blurring of the frontiers between left and right in recent decades, a move which 
has been regarded as positive (Giddens, 1994, 1998) but which has arguably 
undermined positive elements that radical and plural democratic forms of 
debate can take. Our understanding of that which is political is informed by 
Mouffe’s work on agonism where she argues that there is a need for room 
within democracy for open debate where there is discursive space given to all 
positions within a system of broad toleration (Mouffe, 2000, 2005).  Drawing on 
Schmitt’s (1996) ‘friend-foe’ distinction, Mouffe argues that central to politics is 
the need to be able to passionately articulate what and whom you oppose with 
the consequence that to deny the possibility of this will on the one hand 
‘sanitize’ politics, that is, make it dull and uninteresting and, on the other, will 
drive political passions elsewhere (Mouffe, 2002).  Similarly, Canovan’s (1999) 
work argues that there is a need to regard ‘the people’ and their concerns as 
legitimate. Unfortunately, she later undermines this claim, when, in her 
conclusion, she suggests that whilst the people’s concerns are a necessary part 
of the democratic process, they may need to be kept in check to further the 
‘redemptive’ character of democracy. Indeed this is something that is typical of 
contemporary academic discourse where the concerns of ‘the people’, whilst 
‘real’ and ‘legitimate’ in their democratic expression, are viewed as undesirable 
and, ultimately, equated with right-wing politics (see: Mudde, 2004, 2007).
As Laclau and Mouffe (1985) note, such political essentialism is problematic 
because it closes down the space to give sufficient attention to how an 
individual’s politics reflects their struggle with structural positions that are local 
and specific. For Laclau and Mouffe these ‘points of antagonism’ take on 
different ‘forms of struggle’ as individuals develop political views that then 
allow them to interpret and respond to their structural positions within any 
given social formation. Of course, much of this thinking — about the value of 
autonomy and the importance of context — extends from Gramsci (1971) who 
suggested that counter-hegemonic forces should not concentrate their attack 
on a single front, against one seat of power, but, rather, should engage in a 
variety of progressive struggles according to its own contextually-specific logic 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 178). In other words, local struggles reflect 
contextually-specific antagonisms that have provided the grounds for locally-
situated groups to organise into counter-hegemonic movements. For Laclau 
and Mouffe, the scale and scope of these struggles vary depending on whether 
the antagonisms are represented more broadly. Thus, a national movement 
may be considered ‘local’ in the sense that it reflects contextually-specific 
concerns that need to be addressed. The important point of Laclau and Mouffe 
is that in focusing on context one reserves a space for plurality and autonomy 
among the elements for the creation of a counter-hegemonic bloc and this is 
central for the sort of innovation in tactics needed to respond effectively to the 
specificity of contemporary antagonisms (see Brock and Carrigan, 2014; also 
Smith, 2012). 
This position is well supported in classical liberal texts (eg, Mill, 1972) but, 
more recently, in the arguments of John Keane (2009: 855), who argues that 
the democratic ideal is linked to an active commitment to ‘pluriversality’ — the 
need to ‘empower people everywhere, so that they can get on with living their 
diverse lives on earth freed from the pride and prejudice of moguls, magnates, 
tyrants and tycoons’ [emphasis added].
This is our point of departure. We look to research on young people’s political 
views in 14 European countries to consider the important role that local and 
regional factors play in explaining the differences in views between these 
locales whilst also pausing to consider the contradictions that emerge within 
them. In other words, the empirical realities of young people’s politics leads us 
to question the myth that the term populism peddles: that ideology is a well-
integrated system of beliefs that adequately pits the concerns of the ‘ordinary 
people’ against some other social group. Rather, we would suggest that 
populisms emerge to reflect the local and regional conditions that prompt 
young people to problematise concrete problems.
This is significant for us because we wish to challenge academic discourse that 
has a strong normative perspective and often denies open debate over the 
legitimacy of views it finds undesirable. In this discourse, it is widely 
understood that the propensity of the general population towards particular 
policies often described as populist is high but that the failure of so called 
populist parties to mobilise this support is the reason why such views never 
actually reach the statute books (Mudde, 2007). Looking to the views of young 
people, we hope to show why such a conclusion necessarily implies possible 
power imbalances between how young people’s political views are treated 
across Europe.
In a recent study of voters (Akkerman et al., 2014), evidence suggests that 
populist views are associated with a propensity for voting for populist parties. 
While this may seem tautological, attitudes do not always translate into 
behaviour.  The evidence examined in this paper contributes to the literature 
on the demand side of populism, through an engagement with individual views 
on four specific dimensions associated with both populism and the extreme 
right wing: xenophobia1, cynicism, authoritarianism and nativism.  This four 
dimensional representation of components of (right-wing) populism has been 
used elsewhere (Mudde, 2007; Harrison and Bruter, 2011).  We argue that 
views expressed on these dimensions, whatever their content, are important 
indicators of the political concerns of these young people.  We are interested in 
the extent to which views are independent of locale or are regionally specific 
and the extent to which dimensions of populism are associated with the left-
right political spectrum, in particular its extremities. Finally we are interested in 
the ideological coherence, or rather the lack of it, when it comes to young 
people’s ‘populist’ views.  
The article thus tests the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: that dimensions of populism are locally specific.
Hypothesis 2: that populist views are orthogonal to the left right spectrum.
Hypothesis 3: that there are ideological contradictions associated with those 
regarded as possessing populist views.
Data and methods
The MYPLACE questionnaire survey, explained in greater depth in the 
introduction to this volume is a common research instrument administered to a 
representative sample of 16-25 year olds in 30 separate locations in 14 
different countries. The data was collected between September 2012 and April 
2013, with an achieved overall sample of 16,935.  Each country selected two 
contrasting locations (with 4 in Germany:  2 in the old East and 2 in the old 
West) where the criteria for selection was that there were a priori reasons to 
suggest that the attitudes, behaviour and experiences of the young people 
would be different.  This means that we have a range of research sites, each 
with distinct features which are unique to themselves and which require an 
understanding of local as well as national contexts to fully appreciate the 
reasons why young people hold the attitudes that they do.  It is important to 
reiterate that these are a series of local case studies and not nationally 
representative results. 
Four indices representing the aforementioned dimensions of populism 
(xenophobia, cynicism, authoritarianism and nativism) are created using a 
range of questions from the MYPLACE survey. While our analysis is embedded 
within a critical engagement with previous empirical work on populism we do 
not reject the use of these widely accepted measures.  Our aim is to better 
understand the dynamics which contribute to widespread support for such 
indices of populism and to explore the legitimacy of these beliefs in 
mainstream political discourse.  The questions used to construct these indices 
are presented in Appendix 1. All composite variables are justified on the basis 
of factor analysis, and internal reliability is measured using Cronbach Alpha or 
Person’s r. All questions used were five point Likert scales which were recoded 
to 0 to 4, summed and rescaled 0 to 1, with a high score representing high 
levels on each index (see Appendix 1).
The central method used here to test the hypotheses are multilevel regression 
models (Hox, 2010; Heck et al., 2010) as these models are best able to 
articulate the structure of the research design.  The 30 different research sites 
are selected in order to maximise variability within each country and it is a 
reasonable assumption to anticipate variability between countries. 
Four models are presented, one for each of the dimensions described above. 
Final models with a common set of individual and contextual variables are 
shown in order to facilitate comparability of predictor variables.  
Findings
The mean scores for each location on each of the four dimensions as well as 
the left-right scale are shown in Table 1 along with the overall grand mean. 
The dark shading indicates those locations which are in the upper quartile and 
the pale shading those that are in the lower quartile and thus highlight the 
locations where there are higher and lower average tendencies to have these 
views.  Average levels of cynicism and nativism are high (0.692 and 0.705 
respectively on a scale of 0 to 1), well above the centre of the scale, whereas 
the average for xenophobia (0.544) is towards the centre of the scale and for 
authoritarianism (0.344) it is much lower.  Almost all these figures are within 
one standard deviation of the mean, the exceptions being both Danish sites on 
the cynicism index and three of the German sites (not Bremerhaven) on the 
xenophobia index.  It is inappropriate to draw strong conclusions from these 
figures as they represent the mean scores for each location independent from 
any other variable and are therefore sensitive to the distribution of the index 
within the location.  They are of interest, however, in terms of the magnitude of 
the scores on the cynicism and nativism indices, both of which are a clear 
indication of the general strength of views across the board on these issues. 
Harrison and Bruter (2011) find the same but are more interested in regional 
variation as opposed to the absolute figure.  Our belief is that the average 
magnitude is an important indicator of the breadth of populist views and as 
such shows that these dimensions, at least, must be regarded as central to 
personal political views and not some sort of aberration.  It is also worth noting 
that all four German locations as well as both Danish ones have average scores 
below the grand mean on all four indices.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Each index is used as a dependent variable in a multilevel model and subject to 
analysis alongside a common set of independent variables.  Table 2 shows that 
for all four models a multilevel model is justified and that in all cases that there 
is significant improvement in the fit of the model as both individual level and 
location specific variables are included. 
[Insert Figures 1 to 4] 
When the average location scores for authoritarianism, nativism and 
xenophobia are plotted alongside cynicism there is further reinforcement of the 
locational and regional structure of our data.  While these spatial positions are 
insensitive to individual associations between these variables, such that no 
strong conclusions can be made from them, there are hints that there may be 
country specific averages where the paired locations are close to one another 
such as the locations in Greece, Spain, and Portugal.  On the other hand there 
is also evidence of significant contrast between research locations within a 
country such as in the UK, Croatia and Latvia.  These contrasts are a function of 
the choice of the research location, which sought to maximize within country 
contrasts. 
Multilevel models
The importance of locally specific explanations is shown in two ways.  Firstly, 
the intra class correlations for all four models demonstrate that it would be 
inappropriate to treat the data set as unstructured.  The analysis must take into 
account that there are 30 different locations as by doing so the predictive 
power of the models is significantly enhanced by between 19 per cent and 31 
per cent (with xenophobia2, 31 per cent; cynicism3, 22 per cent; 
authoritarianism4, 26 per cent and nativism5, 19 per cent respectively). 
Secondly, the inclusion of the country level variable indicating welfare state 
type (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kääriäinen and Lehtonen, 2006) further improves 
the model in all cases and brings out a contrast between post-socialist 
countries and Nordic locations; the latter are less likely to be xenophobic, to 
display cynicism and authoritarian views.  Similarly, respondents from German 
locations (a conservative welfare state region), when contrasted with post-
socialist ones, are less likely to be xenophobic and authoritarian, although 
there is no significant difference in terms of cynicism.  There is, however, a 
tendency for respondents in all four German locations (including those in what 
used to be East Germany) to be less nativist than in post socialist countries. 
On this measure, eastern Germany is an outlier compared to other post 
socialist countries. The other findings of significance in terms of welfare state 
regions is the contrast between Mediterranean locations and post-socialist ones 
where the former are more likely to display cynicism but less likely than 
Mediterranean locations to display authoritarian tendencies.  Finally, our data 
showed no significant differences between the UK locations (liberal welfare 
state region) and the post socialist ones.  
[Insert Table 2]
Our second hypothesis, on the orthogonality between populism and the left-
right spectrum, is tested using the question where respondents indicate where 
they are on a 0 to 10 scale.  We have simplified this into four categories: ‘clear6 
left’ (scores 0-2); ‘clear right’ (scores 8-10); ‘centre’ (scores 3 - 7); and ‘don’t 
know’ using the central ‘between clear left and right’ category as the 
reference.  This variable is an indication of a personal position on a political 
scale allowing for expressions of extremity.  Thirteen percent of the distribution 
is ‘clear left’ and 11 per cent ‘clear right’ using this method.
The results show that there is a strong relationship between respondents’ 
stated position on the left-right spectrum and their position on three of the four 
indices xenophobia, authoritarianism and nativism - with those on the clear 
right scoring high and the clear left scoring low.  In terms of these three 
dimensions there is clear evidence that there is a relationship.  On the third 
index on cynicism the findings are reversed with those on the left significantly 
more likely to be cynical and those on the right less likely, though this result is 
not significant.  This complex picture can be interpreted to show that the 
hypothesis of independence between these four dimensions and the left-right 
spectrum cannot be fully supported. However, in terms of confirming or 
refuting a definition of populism focusing on anti-elitism - measured here by 
cynicism - it is possible to conclude that there is no association between those 
who say they are on the clear right (when compared to those in the centre of 
the political spectrum) and their cynicism.  In fact, although the data are less 
clear, cynicism would appear to have the opposite political spectrum 
connotations compared to the other three dimensions.  What it is possible to 
assert, therefore, is that because there is no differentiation between those on 
the clear right and those in the centre in terms of cynicism, equating cynicism 
with those on the right is incorrect. 
[Insert Table 3]
The final hypothesis tests the extent to which we can see ideological coherence 
within the populism indices.  This is measured using the respondents’ answers 
to a question on different economic policies where what are traditionally 
understood as economically left wing perspectives - ‘Competition is harmful, it 
brings out the worst in people’ and ‘Incomes should be made more equal’ - 
contrast with economically right wing perspectives -  ‘The unemployed should 
have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits’ and 
‘Private ownership of business and industry should be increased’. For three of 
the models the indices show that both the economically left and right wing 
variables are positively associated with high scores for xenophobia, 
authoritarianism and nativism.  For all three of these models, respondents 
scoring highly display both left and right wing ideological preferences.  For the 
cynicism index, however, there is a significant association between a high 
score and those supporting economically left wing policies.  We therefore feel 
that there is strong support for our hypothesis that when examining these four 
dimensions that  these young people often hold positions which are 
contradictory in terms of traditionally understood economic ideologies.   
When examining the individual level socio-demographic predictors, gender was 
significant, with males scoring higher than females and, therefore, more likely 
to display xenophobia, cynicism and authoritarianism tendencies. The age 
variable shows a negative significant effect; slightly older young people tend to 
score lower on the xenophobia, authoritarianism and nativism scales.  
However, the reverse is true with cynicism where the model suggests that 
young people at the upper end are more likely to be cynical than their younger 
counterparts. Parental social class is also significant; xenophobia, 
authoritarianism and nativism are negatively associated with higher social 
classes.
Respondents who are more ‘pro-democratic’ are less likely to display 
xenophobic, authoritarian and nativist views than those who are less ‘pro-
democratic’. However, the opposite is true with cynicism where young people 
who score highly on the pro-democracy index are more cynical. Young people 
who have higher levels of satisfaction with democracy in their country are 
significantly less cynical and have higher levels of nativism. Respondents who 
have greater trust in parliament are significantly less likely to display 
xenophobia and cynicism tendencies and are also significantly more likely to 
display nativism tendencies.
Discussion
This paper has begun to map out young people’s political views across Europe 
using the MYPLACE survey data. The analysis suggests that young people take 
up a mixture of political positions, some of which are strongly associated with 
indices of ‘populism’ — cynicism, authoritarianism, nativism and xenophobia. 
What we have shown, in the first instance, is that there is a tendency for these 
positions to map on to locations where there are regional or political histories 
that support the shaping of these views. Thus, locations within western 
European welfare states are less likely to be authoritarian, nativist and 
xenophobic when compared to post-socialist countries. We find evidence to 
support the claim that post-socialist countries are more likely to be populist 
than modern welfare states. 
However, we should approach the term ‘populism’ with some critical distance, 
for where research has, in the past, equated it with political extremes, we have 
sought to view it within the wider context of democratic struggle. We have 
done this by opening up the term ‘populism’ to explore; i. local and regional 
variations; ii. the statistical independence of political cynicism; and iii. 
ideological inconsistency. Rather than equate populism with either left or right 
wing ideology, we have tried to show that young people’s political views are 
often plural and contradictory in nature. Young people’s views do not do not 
always cohere into a single ideological project and this should be an 
understood and respected aspect of democracy (Rancière, 2006; Laclau, 2005). 
While Mudde (2007) suggests that a focus on political parties is of greater 
importance than political attitudes in the extent to which they are able to 
mobilise views regarded as dangerous or inappropriate within contemporary 
democracy, we believe that it is important to study political views from a 
standpoint that accepts the legitimacy of individual viewpoints.  It is arguably an 
indication of the failure of the contemporary democratic political system if the political views of people are regarded as 
secondary to an analysis of political parties. The danger here is obvious: that in focusing on political parties one closes 
down voices that seek to make difficult issues heard
In mapping young people’s political views, we find evidence to suggest that 
there is a variability/plurality of populisms that young people deploy, across 
Europe, to contend with social and political issues that are local and regional in 
scope. This makes it difficult to essentialise what populism constitutes as 
young people’s views comprise a variety of ideological elements — often 
contradictory — and this is why location and regional factors must be 
considered. Evidence shows that there is an important macro element to the 
shaping of young people’s political views and this should be acknowledged 
when describing manifestations of populism.
Why are location and regional factors important when mapping young people’s  
political views?
In approaching the term ‘populism’ from the perspective that it is a plurality, 
we have constructed a set of indices and tested them for local and regional 
variations, showing that young people’s political views may be shaped by 
location and region. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that interesting 
similarities and differences occur between locations but also within locations. 
We would suggest that to attribute social, cultural and political contexts to 
explaining these differences would require further qualitative exploration. Yet, 
in opening up the possibility of local and regional variation, we suggest that 
there is evidence to support the argument that young people are voicing 
concerns that reflect their direct lived experiences.
This paper shows that many of the young people surveyed (indeed the majority 
in some regions) can be regarded as populist to the extent that there is a 
strong tendency to express a cynicism towards politicians and political 
institutions.  The evidence is also clear that aggregate levels of nativism also 
tend to be quite high. On both dimensions, however, it is clear that there is a 
strong geographical pattern which must be understood within the political 
histories of the locations studied. At the same time we show the ways in which 
these young people are associated with further dimensions attributed to 
populism on the right wing.  These often exist alongside an engagement in 
politics and political processes. These findings also demonstrate the 
importance of regional specificity; regions with similar historical trajectories 
and welfare regimes show similar patterns.
We believe our data supports our view that populism must be a plurality 
because it must recognise the many demands that popular subjects make in 
regard to local and regional issues. There is literature which suggests that 
political participation is geographically clustered and that citizens’ participatory 
behaviour is heavily influenced by the behaviour of those who live in close 
proximity to them (Tam Cho and Rudolph, 2008; Kopstein and Reilly, 2000). 
Here, it is suggested that ‘geographic diffusion’ plays an important role in how 
norms, resources and institutions are diffused and how this leads to the 
construction of political democracies. Whilst it is not our intention to prove this 
claim, our evidence does highlight how locality influences young people’s 
political views. 
Following Laclau (2007), we suggest that until it is clear why these articulations 
(particular views) or representations (general positions) emerge — possibly as 
counter-hegemonic interventions of the right against the centre — then it is 
superficial to suggest that ‘populism is on the rise’. In other words, our 
evidence suggests that such is the plurality of populist views that to grasp at 
an explanation of the ‘rise’ or ‘fall’ of populism requires a sophisticated analysis 
of the local and regional features that create the conditions for the emergence 
of such views. In the absence of such recognition, it is plausible that the current 
trend — of pathologising populist views — will continue. ‘Populism—as—
radicalism’ will continue as a strategy, of the Centre, that can be used to close 
down the conditions for the development of a specific dialectic that Mouffe 
sees as key to democracy — agonism. 
Why is it important that young people’s views be considered orthogonal to the 
left-right spectrum?
It follows that young people’s locally influenced concerns might not map neatly 
onto the typical ‘left-right’7 spectrum given that variation between and within 
locations would mean that young people’s views reflect a plurality that 
emerges to contest local and regional structures of power and authority. Thus, 
it makes sense that evidence shows populism to be partially independent from 
the left-right spectrum, as young people respond to a deep dissatisfaction with 
contemporary politics but in ways that mirror their local and regional concerns. 
In other words, it is possible to draw from the analysis the following point: 
cynicism is high across Europe but it is orthogonal to the left-right spectrum. 
This prompts questions about the failure of both left and right politics to 
capture the voices, concerns and imaginations of contemporary youth (see 
Patterson, 2014). This is important because it serves as an indication that 
populism is not wedded to a particular ideological project as is the case in 
literatures which equate it with left or right-wing politics. If it is the case that, 
for some, populism is not ‘aligned’ to a particular ideological project, then there 
is scope to explore whether some individuals consider their views to be 
‘populist’ and, reflecting on hypothesis 1, how social, cultural and political 
contexts shape these views. 
Why is it important that young people’s views are contradictory?
Local issues will inevitably cut across issues of ideological coherence and the 
results show that young people’s personal viewpoints can be informed by 
opposing ideologies. This is supported by the data, which suggest that young 
people often hold positions which are contradictory in terms of traditionally 
understood economic ideologies. Again, it is important not to delegitimise the 
agent in this context by suggesting that these contradictions emerge as a 
result of personal confusion or a problem with accepting change. Rather, it is 
plausible that these contradictions are normal expressions of a range of 
incompatible social logics and beliefs that provide common-‘sense’ with 
elements of incoherence (Laclau, 1984: 183, 185, 189-90). We would argue 
that these elements are a practical aspect of democratic struggle and might 
make it difficult for left and right-wing ideologies to capture young people’s 
concerns and issues. Indeed, there is a sense in which we now need to consider 
how and why such concerns coalesce into what Laclau and Mouffe (1984:129-
30) refer to as a ‘logic of equivalence’ — a representative and democratic front 
for young people’s political views whatever they may be. 
Arguably ‘populism’ is, at best, a misnomer or, at worse, a rhetorical device 
that only serves to silence the voices of politicised young people. As a 
misnomer, we could argue that the term ‘populism’ does not capture the 
empirical realities of young people’s political concerns. Drawing on the 
empirical research, we have shown that we need to pluralise how political 
dissent/assent is expressed - as populisms - in order to render explicit, 
analytically, the geospatial-historical conditions under which such views 
emerge. Indeed, we would suggest that the term populism is a misnomer 
precisely because it fails to capture the empirical complexities that exist when 
new belief systems emerge (or old belief systems re-emerge in new ways).  If 
we recognise the pluralistic nature of political dissent/assent, then the term 
populism becomes a tool through which legitimate, democratic expressions (of 
concrete, local problems) become ‘boxed-off’ as illegitimate forms of political 
utterance, e.g. as populist attitudes which must not be platformed. In effect, 
such a rhetorical strategy only reifies the contradiction — of people’s concerns 
vs. the hegemonic political centre — without resolving its necessary conditions 
for existence.
One question that is now common in the literature is to ask: are these views (of 
youth) either corrective or a threat to democracy? (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 
2012). In response to this, we might suggest that if academics and politicians 
are uncomfortable with the pronouncements by right-wing parties, then it may 
be that this discomfort should prompt the creation of a critique of the centre as 
part of a wider engagement with the wider crises in Western democracy that 
the views of these young people reflect. 
Conclusion
This paper has begun to map young people’s political views across Europe by 
analysing survey data from locations within 14 European countries. Inspired by 
the argument that populist views are expressions of democratic struggle, not 
the views of a ‘backward’ or ‘ignorant’ people, we have tried to open up the 
definition of populism to the plurality that would follow should this be case. The 
analysis has provided evidence to this effect. There is local and regional 
variation in populist views and these views are themselves subject to pluralism 
and inconsistency. This is important because it presents a challenge to those 
who would use ‘populism’ as a convenient pejorative term to dissimulate young 
people’s political views.  Perhaps an even greater challenge is to find ways to 
create the conditions to accommodate ideological plurality and contradiction 
whilst at the same time facilitating populist perspectives as a legitimate 
component of mainstream discourse.
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Questions Factor Cronbach 
alpha/Pearsons r
Consider the following statements and 
indicate whether you agree or disagree: 
‘Foreigners should not be allowed to buy 
land in [COUNTRY]’
Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?
‘[COUNTRY] should have stricter border 
controls and visa restrictions to prevent 
further immigration’. 
‘When jobs are scarce, employers should 
give priority to [COUNTRY] people over 
foreign workers’
Five point Likert scales ‘agree’ to ‘Disagree’, 
recoded 0 – 4, summed and rescaled 0-1 
with a high score indicating xenophobia.
Xenopho
bia





Do you agree or disagree? Politicians are 
corrupt. The rich have too much influence 
over politics. 1-5 Likert scale recoded to 0-4, 










I am going to describe various types of 
political systems and ask what you think 
about each as a way of governing this 
country. For each one, would you say it is a 
very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad 
way of governing the country?
Having a strong leader who is not 
constrained by parliament
Having the army rule
5 point scale of ‘good’ to ‘bad’, recoded 0-4, 
summed and rescaled 0-1 with a high score 




from 0.22 in 
Portugal to 0.514 
in western 
Germany
Some people say the following things are 
important for being a citizen of [COUNTRY]. 
Others say that they are not important. How 
important do you think each of the following 
is?
To have been born in [COUNTRY]
To be able to speak [THE 
NATIONAL LANGUAGE]
To have at least one [COUNTRY] parent
To respect [COUNTRY] political institutions 
and laws
Five point Likert scale ‘very important’ to 
‘not important at all’ recoded 0-4 ,summed 
and rescaled 0-1 with a high score indicating 
a tendency towards importance.
Nativism Alpha=0.685,
Varies from 
0.610 in western 
Germany to 
0.750 in Hungary 
and Georgia
1Endnotes  
 See Appendix for an explanation of how each of these dimensions is operationalized in this 
study.
2 Due to the high number of missing cases in some of the questions, 27 per 
cent of the cases were excluded from the regression analysis, leaving 
n=12,435. The initial analysis of variance components reveals that 68.8 per 
cent of variance in xenophobia can be explained by differences between 
individuals, whereas 31.2 per cent of the variance lies at the level of localities 
(intra-class correlation (ICC) = 0.312) (Table 2). The substantial variation at the 
level of localities means that it is necessary to search for contextual variables 
that would help to explain it. Inclusion of the individual level variables resulted 
in a 7.6 per cent decrease of residual, individual level variance, and led to an 
even larger – 36.7 per cent reduction in intercept variance. This means that 
much of the observed differences between localities are due to the composition 
effect, ie differing individual characteristics of their young residents. In the next 
step, we added a number of contextual variables, which helped to achieve a 
massive 67.1 per cent reduction of intercept variance compared to the model 
containing only the individual level predictors – again, an improvement that is 
highly significant. This means that our selected contextual variables are 
capable of explaining a huge portion of the unexplained variation in 
xenophobia between localities. Only 9.3 per cent of unexplained variance 
remains at the level of localities, although it is still significant (at 0.01 level). 
The chi-square test of deviances ( df = 31, loglikelihood = 624.351) confirmsΔ Δ  
that it is statistically significant.
3 Again, 26.3 per cent of the cases were excluded from the regression analysis 
due to missing values, leaving n=12,484. The initial analysis of variance 
components reveals that 77.8 per cent of variance in cynicism can be 
explained by differences between individuals, whereas 22.2 per cent of the 
variance lies at the level of localities (intra-class correlation (ICC) = 0.222) 
(Table 2). The substantial variation at the level of localities means that it is 
necessary to search for contextual variables that would help to explain it. 
Inclusion of the previously described individual level variables resulted in a 13 
per cent decrease of residual, individual level variance, and led to an even 
larger – 53.6 per cent reduction in intercept variance. It means that much of 
the observed differences between localities are due to the composition effect, 
ie differing individual characteristics of their young residents. In the next step, 
we added a number of contextual variables, which helped to achieve a massive 
79.8 percent reduction of intercept variance compared to the model containing 
only the individual level predictors – again, an improvement that is highly 
significant. This means that our selected contextual variables are capable of 
explaining a huge portion of the unexplained variation in cynicism between 
localities. Only 3 per cent of unexplained variance remains at the level of 
localities, although it is still significant (at 0.01 level).The chi-square test of 
deviances ( df = 31, loglikelihood = 1173.588) confirms that it is statisticallyΔ Δ  
significant.
4 There were 27.4 per cent of cases with missing values excluded from the 
regression analysis, leaving n=12,303. The initial analysis of variance 
components reveals that 73.7 per cent of variance in authoritarianism can be 
explained by differences between individuals, whereas 26.3 per cent of the 
variance lies at the level of localities (intra-class correlation (ICC) = 0.263) 
(Table 2). The substantial variation at the level of localities means that it is 
necessary to search for contextual variables that would help to explain it. 
Inclusion of the previously described individual level variables resulted in a 9.3 
per cent decrease of residual, individual level variance, and led to an even 
larger – 25.4 per cent reduction in intercept variance. It means that much of 
the observed differences between localities are due to the composition effect, 
ie differing individual characteristics of their young residents. In the next step, 
we added a number of contextual variables, which helped to achieve a 43.7 per 
cent reduction of intercept variance compared to the model containing only the 
individual level predictors – again, an improvement that is highly significant. 
This means that our selected contextual variables are capable of explaining a 
huge portion of the unexplained variation in authoritarian between localities. 
Only 14.4 per cent of unexplained variance remains at the level of localities, 
although it is still significant (at 0.01 level). The chi-square test of deviances 
( df = 31, loglikelihood = 1194.808) confirms that it is statistically significant.Δ Δ
5 In this model, 24.5 per cent of the cases were excluded from the regression 
analysis, leaving n=12,768. The initial analysis of variance components reveals 
that 81 per cent of variance in nativism can be explained by differences 
between individuals, whereas 19 percent of the variance lies at the level of 
localities (intra-class correlation (ICC) = 0.19) (Table 2). The substantial 
variation at the level of localities means that it is necessary to search for 
contextual variables that would help to explain it. Inclusion of the previously 
described individual level variables resulted in a 7 per cent decrease of 
residual, individual level variance, and led to an even larger – 19.8 per cent 
reduction in intercept variance. This means that much of the observed 
differences between localities are due to the composition effect, ie differing 
individual characteristics of their young residents. In the next step, we added a 
number of contextual variables, which helped to achieve a 12.4 per cent 
reduction of intercept variance compared to the model containing only the 
individual level predictors – again, an improvement that is highly significant. 
This means that our selected contextual variables are capable of explaining a 
huge portion of the unexplained variation in nativism between localities. Only 
15 per cent of unexplained variance remains at the level of localities, although 
it is still significant (at 0.01 level). The chi-square test of deviances ( df = 31,Δ  
loglikelihood = 376.033) confirms that it is statistically significant.Δ
6 The description of ‘clear’ left and right is used here rather than ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ because 
of the way in which the spectrum variable has been recoded to include the three codes at 
either end of the spectrum.  It seems inappropriate to use the descriptor ‘extreme’ as this 
ought to be reserved for those at the extremities but by self-assigning toward one of the far 
ends is, arguably, a ‘clear’ preference.
7 Understandings of ‘left’ and ‘right’ vary across Europe.  High levels of ‘don’t know’ responses 
were found in many countries, not just post-socialist, which rendered the use of the 0-10 scale 
problematic hence the decision to produce a categorical representation which is more robust as 
it captures both those with stated positions as well as those for whom the question led to 
uncertainty.   
